INTRODUCTION TO ANTROPOLOGHY

While nonhuman primates tend to respond to sexual stimuli with very direct and largely unrestrained biological responses, human so¬cieties heavily restrict sexual behavior accord¬ing to elaborate conventions, and it has been suggested that under these circumstances much of the emotional energy associated with sex tends to be sublimated into other activities. But the practice of pair-bonding leads among humans to something even more important than this. It leads to the institutionalization of the FAMILY, a social group comprising the orig¬inal pair-bonded adults plus their offspring.
Anthropologists and sociologists still debate the ideal definition of the term family, but all agree that in some way the idea of the family combines the idea of pair-bonding with the concept of the household, a cooperating eco¬nomic unit. The evolutionary history of the family as a social institution makes this clear. The pair-bond is a form of cooperation which developed because it promoted the survival chances of the offspring. The essence of the family is rooted in the formation of a pair¬
bond between adult males and females who cooperate to ensure not only their own survival but more particularly the survival of their offspring-to ensure, in broader evolutionary terms, the genetic survival of the lineage. The family may therefore best be defined as a social group comprising one or more males linked' by a socially recognized set of mutual obliga¬tions and privileges to one or more females, together with their offspring, who face the problem of survival as a joint enterprise.
The human family is itself but the basic unit in a more complex network of community ties. As memory developed among our hominid forebears, so the pattern of behavior learned in infancy tended to be preserved into adult¬hood. Baboon infants lose their special rela¬tions with their mother as they grow into adulthood; and of course they know no father. On the other hand, chimpanzees, which we have equated with a Ramapithecine level of behavior, may reveal a partial extension of infant patterns of behavior into adulthood in the apparent development of incest prohibitions
that prevent the adult male from attempting sexual relations with his own mother. The further development of memory among our own hominid ancestors resulted in a still greater projection of attitudes learned during childhood into adulthood.
The slow but significant evolution of speech
among hominids would also tend to promote the conventionalization of patterns of learned behavior, not only through the exchange of ideas but also by the invention of fixed labels for particular individuals. Labels such as "mother," "father," "sister," and "brother" which are learned in infancy continue to be
used in adulthood, and thus perpetuate into adulthood the patterns of affection, trust, and mutual obligation acquired during infancy. As adults, human males and females continue to be guided by the social rules learned in infancy. In contrast to most nonhuman primate societies, in which old age incapacitates indi¬viduals in the struggle for dominance and sub¬mission, the human father may retain the loy¬alty of his children even in sickness and senility.
Patterns of affection and obligation develop between siblings as well as between parents and children, and as brothers and sisters grow up to marry and establish their own families, so eventually the entire community will tend to become interlaced by a pattern of learned roles, attitudes, and statuses. Thus a man's brother becomes, in the course of time, an uncle to his children, and his brother's children become his own sons' cousins. In this way not only did pair-bonding produce the family, but at the human level it also produced the concept of KINSHIP. It effectively replaced intragroup conflict by intragroup cooperation substituting patterns of mutual obligations for dominance and submission as the basis of social order. Henceforth every hominid born into the group acquired at birth a set of privileges and obliga¬tions, a recognized niche in an integrated social system. Kinship had evolutionary value in that it replaced the principle of dominance, rooted in conflict, with an ascriptive system in which social order was ensured by a pattern of learned behavior-the rules and obligations implicit in kinship ties-acquired at birth; thereby transforming the hominid band into a more efficient team of cooperating individuals who faced the problem of survival as a joint venture. Kinship was a cultural innovation that had survival value, and those groups which first developed efficient kinship systems had superior survival chances over those that lagged in this respect.
Held together by a network of kinship priv¬
ileges and obligations, earlier human societies saw kinship not as we see it. In kinship based societies kinship is not just another category of social behavior in the sense of political, religious, or economic relations. In such so¬cieties kinship implies almost every other kind of relationship known to society. It embraces them all. In such societies kinship is the bond that holds all the members of the society to¬gether, and defines their behavior and rela¬tionships completely. Traditional kinship obli¬gations and privileges define the limits of all possible relationships between the members of the community.
Only when society becomes larger do we begin to find distinctive political institutions that are not an integral part of the kinship system. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS may be des¬cribed as socially approved processes for de¬fining the norms of acceptable conduct, for allocating offices of leadership, for settling dis¬putes, and for organizing group defense. In earlier human societies the kinship system took care of all this. Only at a higher level of social complexity do distinctive nonkinship political institutions begin to emerge. Government consequently emerges unheralded as local groups begin to grow in complexity, initially through an elaboration of the kinship system, and only later by the inauguration of political institutions separate from the kinship struc¬ture.
BAND SOCIETIES
Thus the analogy of primate society, the evidence of archeology, and the study of sur¬viving hunting and gathering societies all sug¬gest that man's primordial hominid ancestors lived in small territorially based communities long before they had evolved to Horno sapiens status. These early hominid territorial groups are known as BANDS, to distinguish them from the nonhuman primate troop from which they
probably evolved and from which they differ because the hominid habit of pair-bonding and the resultant family pattern of social orga¬nization involves food sharing and a division of labor between the sexes.
At the simplest level these small human bands' each represented a distinct Mendelian population, being primarily inbreeding and hence largely isolated from a genetic point of view, like nonhuman primate troops. Such predominantly inbreeding hominid territorial groups are known as ENDOGAMOUS BANDS.
Each endogamous band is autonomous in its own territory, and roams around this territory more or less continuously in search of food. Although divided into families, each individual is linked to every other individual by ties of kinship and the bonds of close companionship. The principle of incest normally operates to
prevent sexual relations between members of the same family unit, but the simple fact of distance causes the members of these bands to find a mate from another family within the band.
Band type societies are described as aceph¬alous.2 They generally lack headmen or lead¬ers. A person who shows particular talent may be listened to with respect, but each adult male, as the head of his own nuclear family, is essen¬tially a free agent in his own right, bound only by the cultural traditions which oblige him to show loyalty and diffidence to his fellows, har_ ticularly to those who are senior to him in the kinship system. There is no sense of authorita¬tive power in a band type of society in the sense that authority implies coercive power vested in any individual by the members of the group.
'Band type societies are further discussed in Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization (New York: Ran¬dom House, Inc., 1971).
zSee Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), on "equalitarian societies."
F€G. 22 NioNHt!CtF..-N F
e- TP 00PS
BANDS
a. The nonhuman primate troop occupies its own distinctive ter¬ritory. Order is maintained pri¬marily through dominance and submission. There is no food sharing.
b. The endogamous human band occupies its own territory but is distinguished by pair¬bonding relationships which in¬volve food sharing. Order is maintained principally by kin¬ship ties arising out of family units.
a. Formerly Endogamous Band Colonizes Neighboring Territory. Overpopulation or similar circumstances cause an emigrant group to colonize the neighboring territory, establishing a separate, autonomous band.
b.
b. Two Intermarrying Exogamous Bands Formed. Ex¬ogamy develops, possibly as an extension of the incest principle, and the marital arrangements continue to rein¬force the cultural, linguistic, and genetic unity of the total society generation after generation. This diagram illus¬trates the relationship between two exogamous bands, each politically autonomous in its own territory.
c.
c. Cooperating Exogamous Bands. Exogamous bands have a greater survival potential than endogamous bands in the event of conflict over territorial occupancy. The con¬sciousness of cultural and genetic unity is likely to cause the exogamous bands to cooperate when threatened by alien intrusion.
d.
d. (Left) Tribal Society with Central Coordinating Au¬thority. (Right) Exogamous Bands Relying on Sponta¬neous Cooperation without Central Political Body. Tribal societies, with tribal councils, chieftains, or other coordi¬nating personnel, also have a greater survival potential than groups of exogamous bands, which, though willing to cooperate with each other for mutual survival, lack an efficient coordinating mechanism.
With increasing social complexity some form of authoritative community leadership becomes necessary. In a kinship based society the community "headmen" will normally be appointed from one of the more respected families, possibly on an hereditary basis. Portrayed above are village headmen from the Taw-an District of North Borneo. (Courtesy of the North Borneo Information Service.)
elders may or may not elect a permanent chief¬tain, and may not necessarily have any coercive power; but even if it functions in a consultative sense only, once some kind of supraband coor¬dinating mechanism exists, we have a politi¬cally cohesive tribal society.
The earliest tribal councils were still rooted in the concept of kinship. Thus among the Bantu tribes of Rhodesia, all government is essentially familistic at the village level. When an issue is to be decided, the male heads of families will meet to discuss the matter under
the "chairmanship" of the village headman, a position which is usually hereditary, being equivalent to a clan or lineage chief. All deci¬sions are taken unanimously_ The idea of a majority group dominating a sulking minority is objectionable in a tight kin group. Such debates may take several days, but in the end, as the mood of the meeting becomes more clear, the minority will eventually withdraw any objections they may have had and agree with the majority element, putting on as good a face as possible. In such debates, however,
stitutes a considerably more formidable body than a single endogamous band, the latter in¬evitably give way to exogamous bands. Only a few endogamous band-type societies have survived into this century, and these are mostly located, like the Yahgan, in the more remote corners of the earth.
Clans
In the course of time exogamous bands tend to emphasize kinship rather than the concept of contiguity. Territoriality is the main princi¬ple behind the band, even though internal co¬operation is ensured by kinship, but the regu¬larization of interband marriages will emphasize the role of kinship to the point that the concept of kinship eventually replaces that of territo¬riality in social significance. When this happens the members of an exogamous band will think of themselves as the members of a specific and identifiable kinship group, such as a clan.
By definition, a CLAN is a group of people who believe themselves to be bound to each other by reciprocal privileges and obligations by virtue of descent from a common ancestor, real or imaginary. Clans always have distin¬guishing names, and this may be the name of a patriarchal hero-founder. Thus, if a man called Donald were to lead his family to settle a new territory, it is possible that-as in the Highlands of Scotland-the descendants of this hero-father called Donald may call them¬selves "MacDonalds," for Mac means simply "grandson of," a term which also by implica¬tion includes great-grandsons and all subse¬quent descendants. The Irish O' has the same meaning, an "O'Reilly" being a "grandson" (or descendant) of the great clanfounder, the hero¬leader Reilly. All subsequent members of the band might then call themselves "MacDon¬alds" or "O'Reillys" as the case may be.
In the course of time the MacDonalds may be successful in their new location and prolif¬erate, sending off a new colony to settle fresh
land adjacent to the parent territory. Only one or two families may be involved, and if the leader of this colony is named "Millan," the succeeding generations may call themselves "MacMillans." Because the MacMillans and the MacDonalds share the same heritage of folklore, language, and culture, and because they will remember that they are related to each other, they will feel safe with each other when they meet on the border, and probably negotiate exogamously, MacDonald men marrying MacMillan women and vice versa. Many variations on this hypothetical pattern of naming and clan organization may arise, such as the totemistic system described in the following chapter, but the principle is the same.
Tribes
The concept of the tribe is one of the most disputed subjects in anthropology.3 Some writers accept a group of intermarrying exoga¬mous bands as a tribe, provided that the mem¬bers think of themselves as a kin-related group and share a common language, culture, and contiguous set of territories. They stress that a band is essentially a territorial unit, whereas the principle of the tribe is rooted in the prin¬ciple of kinship rather than that of territory. It would seem reasonable, however, to dis¬tinguish between bands and tribes more clearly than this, by enquiring to what extent a degree of political integration may exist. Bands are essentially autonomous units; but in a political sense a tribe always has some estab¬lished formula for coordinating the rela¬tionship between the member clans or other kinship units. When territorially segregated clans that cooperate regularly establish a clan council to exercise some kind of cohesive unity between the different territories or clans, they become a tribe. Such a council of clan or tribal
3 Fried, pp. 154 f.
ethnic type with a distinct gene pool, and re¬garding all its members as kinsmen who speak the same language and share a common cul¬tural, historical, and linguistic heritage.
Thus national government in early historic Europe mostly had its roots in the collective village settlement, originally comprising a re¬lated group of families, the members of which owned the land communally. The town of Hastings in England, for example, was origi¬nally called Haest-inga meaning simply the inga or descendants of Haest. The heads of families in each village were regarded as equals, but a village chief was normally chosen for life from among the eligible members of one family which was regarded as senior to the others. The heads of families then assembled after work every day to discuss the day's events, under the chairmanship of the village headman. When a tribal decision had to be made, the headman from each village would attend a tribal council where he represented his kinsmen under the chairmanship of a tribal chieftain .4 In the course of time, as larger political units came into being, this elementary system of kinship representation became transformed into a three-tier political structure comprising a hereditary national leader or King; a Council o, f Nobles representing the local clan or tribal chieftains who met periodically with the king as an advisory body, and a Gen¬eral Assembly of all the adult freemen who, being heads of households, were entitled to be consulted on important matters. This ancient system is still reflected in the British system of a King; a House of Lords, comprising the hereditary nobles; and a House of Commons, representing the freemen_ Only in the last cen¬tury was political representation in Britain extended to women and other adults who were not heads of households.
'See also Paul Kirchoff, "The Principles of Clanship in Human Society," in M. F. Fried (ed.), Readings in An¬thropology, Vol. II (New York: Thomas 1'. Crowell Com¬pany, 1968).
It is significant that the English word king derives from the Anglo-Saxon cyning, literally meaning a "man of the kin," in the sense of the purest descendant from the original tribal founder and therefore the "father" of the living family of descendants. When an hereditary nobility and royalty emerge we talk of a rit¬ually stratified society,5 for hereditary positions of leadership always tend to be reinforced by ritual ceremonial and frequently also by magi¬coreligious sanctions. Kings will be crowned with solemn ceremony and sacrifices may be offered to royal ancestors. The existence of such ritual stratification in a tribal society does not necessarily mean that the hereditary office¬holders exercise arbitrary authority. Kings are not necessarily "people who order other peo¬ple around," as an American schoolchild once told the author. On the contrary, traditional kings reigned rather than ruled. As symbols of tribal and national blood unity, the authority of kings is generally heavily circumscribed by custom. While kinship remains the ' basis of society, no king may impose any decision on his kinsmen that may be regarded as unjust according to tradition and the dictates of the national culture. Prior to the coming of feudal¬ism, kings were customarily loved and revered as symbols of the unity of the nation-family, the people feeling that the kings belonged to them, rather than the reverse.
The Principle of Coercive Power
In the various social systems which we have so far described, ranging from bands to tribal and national organizations, kinship has been the dominant principle around which social relations are organized. Because of the relative simplicity of the societies which we have de¬scribed, the individual band, clan, or tribal member is able to play a fairly significant role
SSee J. G. Fra2er, The Magical Origin of Kings (London: Dawson of Pall Mall, 1968), for further reading on the origins of kingship.
FIG. 24 THE TMAL COUI`~-CP6..
political organization in a kinship-based society fre¬qUendy takes the form of a council of family heads or clan elders, status positions being ascribed by birth and marriage
4


0=0 I
r__1
p O A O IL O A O
the more senior, experienced, and respected family heads may wield more influence than the younger ones, and the better orators often have considerable influence. When a unani¬mous village opinion has been reached, the headman and several other villagers will attend a similar meeting of village representatives at the home of the district chief, and the process is repeated. Eventually the district chiefs at¬tend a meeting at the residence of the tribal chieftain, when a final and binding resolution is passed.
Tribal societies can be classified according to two major principles. The obvious way in which a tribe can come into existence is by an increase in population, with a resultant ex¬pansion in area of settlement, which causes a single band to grow into a number of exoga¬mous bands. As these become separate in¬termarrying clans, linked by a tribal council of clan chiefs and possibly by a tribal chieftain, we have what has been called a classical seg¬mentary tribe-one that has come into exis¬tence in a classical pattern of expansion in numbers and territory, resulting in a segmen¬tation of the original group into a number of intermarrying clans.
Such classical segmentary tribes are often reasonably equalitarian because all members share common ancestors, but tribes can also

result from an amalgamation of different peo¬ples. A population may expand and seize neighboring territories without eliminating the indigenous population. If the victorious tribe subordinates the defeated peoples, treating them as slaves or inferiors and refusing to intermarry with them, a new situation will develop. While admitting the conquered peo¬ple as inferior clans under their political he¬gemony, the victors may still keep the de¬scendants of the conquered clans in subjugation. Such units, comprising a politi¬cally unequal agglomeration of various nonin¬termarrying clans of diverse origins and di¬verse status, differ markedly from classical segmentary tribes, and may be described as composite tribal societies.
Nations
Such is the pressure of populations on re¬sources and territories, that not only have band type societies given way to tribes, but some tribes have multiplied and expanded at the expense of others, absorbing or dispersing the remnants of the less powerful peoples. In such cases the enlarged and more widely dispersed population may itself become subdivided into a number of related and cooperating tribal units. Where external pressures reinforce the internal bonds of loyalty to ensure cooperation under the prestige of a common kinship leader, the term nation may be applied.
The relationship between the nation and the tribe is apparent even etymologically, for our word tribe comes to us from the Latin tribus, indicating a third part of a nation. Nations reflect the kinship ideal at its maximum politi¬cal and territorial extension. Although effective government may become bureaucratic rather than hereditary in principle and the nation may be held together by a variety of economic, political, and social forms, in the thoughts of its nationals a nation is still essentially a large kinship grouping, representing a particular
around the traditionally ascribed respon¬sibilities of kinship cooperation. Only as such societies become more complex and kinship structures began to break down did the old primate principle of dominance and submis¬sion, today known as competitive achievement, begin to undermine the principle of ascription by which roles are determined by the order of birth. As new political institutions steadily replace kinship ties, men begin to eulogize intragroup and even individual competitive¬ness. Participating eagerly in the scramble to win a presidential election or to secure a seat on the politburo in competition with their fellows, they abandon the age-old principle of kinship ascription in favor of a pattern of com¬petitive social mobility and party politics oddly reminiscent of the baboon troop.

Accordingly, there comes a time when posi¬tions of political and administrative respon¬sibility are reinforced by the right to coerce -which in turn may be reinforced by the means to coerce, in the form of a body of armed retainers. In such cases, high office be¬comes in effect a prize for the successful com¬petitor.s In place of kinship leaders who exer¬cise authority restricted by custom on the basis of the consent of the members of society, we find men who regard public offices as spoils to be secured for the sake of the personal re¬wards that they can bring. Regarding authority as their personal property, they may even seek to maintain their position by coercion or by the deliberate manipulation of public opinion. In such societies kinship may still remain an important element in primary, face-to-face loyalties, and the facade of the old clan and tribal chieftainships may survive. But in reality the tribal kinship structure has been replaced by a competitive power system, and the princi¬ples of coercion and manipulation have re¬
6Service, pp. 133 f.
placed the prmcipies ui aZ1..L1Y«W.. -„,,u,c( All subordinate offices-earldoms, chancell ships, and even the position of the vill headman-come to be allocated to those v support the successful candidate for supre office, as one of the rewards of individual 1 alty.
When substantial centralized coercive po is vested in the leaders of a society, we sp of centralized chieftainships. While the leac of Yahgan, Arunta, Pygmy, and Nuer socie have only advisory power, and the Kazak lcl who comes from a White Bone family,7 - has little or no coercive authority, a centrali chieftain such as the Baganda king "nil rather than "reigns." All power is vested in person of one man whose will, however ai trary, will prevail.
In a sense, this development represents beginning of bureaucracy; and the cent ization of power in the hands of a single lea has a certain organizational superiority c the older pattern of village headmen, elec or hereditary clan chieftains, and rel sentative tribal councils. Decisions can made incisively and enforced ruthlessly. Si by the nature of the power structure, the preme officeholder is likely to be a man ski in political reality, the chances that he make a reasonably effective leader are mo( ately high. In consequence, centralized ch tainships, in which a single individual or f ily effectively controls appointments subordinate positions, arise as an evolutioc necessity wherever they have a greater surv value than the traditional clan and tribal tems which delegate only limited power: their leaders. The most favorable conditior such a development is likely to be a soc troubled by constant warfare, which ma3 forced to accept a strongly centralized sys of social control in order to survive.
Many quite large and complex societies are not exposed to the threat of war have 'C. Daryll Forde, Habitat, Economy and Society ( York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 332.
Even large industrial societies may preserve the unifying concept of "nanonhooo, lot so mug a6 the members believe themselves to be linked together by common bonds of language, culture, and kinship. The resultant sentiments of unity and willing cooperation can be a source of considerable political power, as witnessed in this century in the case of Germany. View of Berliners on the Kurfurstendamm, West Germany. (Courtesy of the German Information Center, Bonn.)
in his community, and habit and custom govern the course of behavior. Decision mak¬ing is rigidly controlled within traditional limits and the concept of law making, or law giving, in the sense that this implies the delib¬erate creation of new principles of behavior, is generally unknown.
But as societies become larger and more mmplex, rivalries may develop between kin¬ship groups that threaten to disrupt the com¬munity. A village headman or clan chief who is obliged to rely for authority on custom and $e willingness of disputants to obey custom
may be unable to prevent an internecine strug¬gle from breaking out, something that would seldom if ever occur in a community compris¬ing only 20 or 30 individuals. It follows in¬evitably that such leaders tend to acquire, through common consent, a degree of authori¬tative power. This means that when moral persuasion fails, they may use other forms of restraint, including possibly physical inter¬vention to halt a dispute, with the full weight of public consent behind them.
In the earliest Homo sapiens societies, and for most of human history, society revolved
of the English, the King of the Francs, or the King of the Saxons. Feudalism introduced the idea of land and territory as the unifying prin¬ciple, substituting territoriality for the princi¬ple of kinship. After the introduction of feu¬dalism these kings became the King of England, the King of France, and the King of Saxony, claiming ownership of the land and of the people born on that land. The common people ceased to be "tribesmen" and became "subjects." In a sense our contemporary na¬tionality laws still reflect the feudal concept of the subject who belongs to the king or to the government of the land on which he is born. A man or woman born in the land of Britain is today "British" no matter what nationality his parents were, and the same is the case in America. The child "belongs" to the governing authority of Britain or America regardless of the kinship status or race of his parents. Such principles for determining nationality would be impossible in a tribal society-or even in ancient Greece or Republican Rome-where membership of the city-state was based on kinship, not on the accident of being born within the limits of the territory.

As power and control over land and people replaces the principle of kinship in feudal so¬cieties, the institutions of government become identifiably separate from the rest of the social structure. In the feudal Ashanti kingdom of West Africa we may identify all the main offices found in a modern bureaucracy, includ¬ing an administrative machinery with regular revenue-collecting personnel, law courts, army, and exchequer, each operating as separate facets of a single central government which was legitimized by the symbol of the sacred "stool," in which the soul of the royal ances¬tors was supposed to reside.
Feudalism consequently introduced the idea of the political state as a separate legal entity
divorced from kinship. The state is essentially a political and economic unit, not a kinship group. It represents a governing political clique who are essentially distinct from the people, hence the antagonism felt by the peas¬antry against the government and its tax co]_ lectors, who are seen as exploiting aliens, ex¬ternal to the local kindreds. While central chieftains and successful feudal lords may still surround themselves with an aura of legitimacy derived from genealogical claims, the idea of the political state is more difficult to reconcile with the idea of the "people." Indeed, a new polarization of concepts develops, portraying the state as being in opposition to the individ¬ual. Government becomes so depersonalized that it is often seen as a tool of oppression, and not infrequently those who control the government may wage war against the older kinship groupings or even against the very institution of the family, seeing these as rivals for the loyalty and control of the citizen.
The concept of the state is thus subtly different from that of the nation. The term state implies authoritative political institutions, while the concept of nation implies a society in which the members conceive of themselves as being linked by the common possession of a shared cultural, linguistic, and genetic heri¬tage. Nations still, consequently, comprise a distinct people, bound together more by a sense of ethnic identity than by subordination to a single political ruler or system. By contrast, the subjects or citizens of a state may even speak different languages, as did the citizens of the Austro-Hungarian empire, or belong to differ¬ent races, as do the citizens of the United States of America.
Because of their frequent reliance upon military power to maintain their autocratic position, centralized chieftains may find them¬selves in possession of a powerful war machine and may be tempted to establish CONQUEST STATES by the subordination of less organized neighbors. Such agglomerations of diverse
vealed the ability to live contentedly under clan councils and clan chieftains without ever appointing any full-time authoritative officers. In this way, the Saxons of ancient Europe lived without kings until they were finally conquered by the renowned "central chieftain" Charle¬magne. But whenever there is a degree of po¬litical turbulence, with pressure being exerted from outside groups, or whenever migration and war require an effective coordinating sys¬tem, social power tends to become authorita¬tively vested in a single individual or lineage. Although in tribal societies the kingship may remain elective within the royal family, cen¬tralized chieftainships usually become strictly hereditary in the mode of succession. Indeed the principle of PRIMOGENITURE-the inheri¬tance of an office by the eldest son or daughter -may often arise as a device intended to avoid internecine dispute following the death of the previous officeholder.
Centralized chieftainships are in effect pyr¬amidal or cone-shaped hierarchical structures, in which the ruler occupies the key position with the power to direct the life of the community in an arbitrary fashion, although in reality such power is frequently limited by traditional moral restraints or by the existence of subordi¬nate pressure groups. In this sense they differ from contemporary totalitarian regimes only by the fact that the administration remains essentially personal because of the smaller scale of society. The problems involved in super¬vising a large and rambling empire are consid¬erable, and history records many examples of chieftainships which rose and fell in the life¬time of a single individual leader because of an overextension of the state beyond the limits that a single ruler can effectively control.
chieftain no longer depends for his authority purely upon tribal ties of kinship with the persons over whom he rules. Indeed, the feudal king no longer "reigns" but now "rules" with largely arbitrary authority. Claiming owner¬ship of the land and all who are born upon it, he allocates the control of geographical dis¬tricts to subordinate officers who remain solely responsible to his authority.
The contrast between a kinship or tribal society and a feudal society is amply illustrated in the history of Europe. Prior to the rise of feudalism, northern Europe remained essen¬tially tribal, each people having its own king or kin-father, who was designated as the King

Feudalisna
1~EUDALISNt represents the principle of the centralized chieftainship at its most highly organized but still personal and prebureau¬aatic level. In a feudal society the centralized
Feudalism combines the authoritative power of a central¬ized chieftainship with a bureaucratic system of subordi¬nate chieftains or territorial, overlords. The castle of AI¬rnourol in Portugal stands as an impressive reminder of the responsibility for defense that attached to feudal office. (Courtesy of the Director-General of Information, Portugal.)
force may marry the heiress to the throne of that country so that his heirs will be legitimate heirs in the eyes of the people. Furthermore, the careful ruler will maintain law and order, suppress criminals, and uphold the traditional mores of the society so as to win public ap¬proval. Successful international ventures, which raise the nation's self-esteem, will also win public support, and so serve to legitimize the ruler's position.
But there are less constitutional ways in which a ruler or ruling clique can secure its position. Economic control is more subtle than outright military coercion. When the ruling group can monopolize control over the major economic activities, it will be in a position to offer economic rewards for collaboration and penalize noncollaborators by denying them access to the more profitable fields of enter¬prise. Even more insidious is the attempt at mind control. In simpler societies the norms and attitudes of society are transmitted through custom, folklore, and tradition by
word of mouth from generation to generatior but in more complex societies, sentiments am attitudes are largely disseminated through mas media and by way of formal education. Sinc the control of mass media and education fal: within a series of structured and bureaucrat: systems, it is highly susceptible to manipl lation. In totalitarian societies both the ma; media and the educational system are usual government-owned and therefore under dire political control. Through them, even has norms, values, and judgments can be substa: tially remodeled to suit the requirements of f dominant group. It is one of the characteristi of the multiethnic and culturally diverse mo ern political state that the government, fi quently representing the interests of one sc tion of society only, will resort to mind cont: in the attempt to educate all members of so ety to accept the values and goals of the dor nant element-which need not necessarily the majority element. .

Eisenstadt, S. N., 1959, "Primitive Political Systems," American Anthropologist 61:a 219.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 1940, The Political System of the Anuak of the Anglo-Egyl Sudan. London: London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropol 4.
, 1948, The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan. New 5 Cambridge University Press.
Fortes, M., and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 1961, African Political Systems. Oxford: Inn tional African Institute.
Fried, M. R., 1967, The Evolution of Political Society. New York: Random House. Krader, L., 1968, The Formation of the State. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Leach, E. R., 1971, Political Systems of Highland Burma. New York: Humanities 1 Inc.
Lowie, R. H., 1927, The Origin of the State. New York: Russell and Russell. Mair, L., 1962, Primitive Government. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc. Ratzenhofer, G., 1893, Wesen und Zweck der Politik, 3 vols. Leipzig: F. A. Broc Verlag.
Schapera, L, 1956, Government and Politics in 7'ribal Societies. London: C. A. W Co., Ltd.
Service, E. R., 1971, Primitive Social Organization. New York: Random House,
ethnic origins are also called PRIMITIVE STATES, the label "primitive" being applied since gov¬ernment is still personalized, not bureaucratic. The Zulu kings of Africa ruled over a large primitive state, and effectively made "Zulus" out of the people they conquered. The Aztecs, by contrast, did not attempt to assimilate their subject tribes but maintairled their hegemony over a multinational or multiethnic state. But such primitive states are usually limited in size and often highly unstable when controlled by the personal abilities of a single centralized chieftain and his henchmen. Long-lasting primitive states consequently tend to develop more complex and professionalized bureau¬cratic systems of government, capable of per¬petuating themselves independently of the life span or genius of the ruler. In such fullfledged BUREAUCRATIC STATES as Ancient Egypt, An¬cient China, or the Austro-Hungarian empire, the bureaucracy usually succeeds in subordi¬nating the central chieftain to the system, and we find ourselves studying the type of central¬ized bureaucratic state system with which we are so familiar in the contemporary Western world.
Although the possession of coercive power is the attribute of government officials from the centralized chieftain to the bureaucratic offi¬cials who direct the modern state, social power which is rooted solely in the use of force is costly in terms of effort and always raises the possibility of reaction and rebellion. Govern¬ment actions which contravene old established norms will certainly provoke hostility among those who are ruled. Those who hold power in such societies will constantly strive to re¬duce their dependence upon coercive power by seeking to constitutionalize their position and so gain the willing cooperation of their sub¬jects. Essential in this process is the need to create an impression Of LEGITIMACY.8
A "legitimate" officeholder, in the final anal¬ysis, is simply one who holds his position with the approval of the members of his society. Kinship certainly provides legitimacy; and a chieftain who annexes a neighboring land by
xGerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1966), pp. 59 f.
The conquest of one people by another frequently leads to the formation of multiethnic "con¬quest states" where peoples of diverse ethnic, cultural, and lin¬guistic backgrounds are subor¬dinated under a single govern¬ment and are held together by political, and sometimes mili¬tary, means rather than by shared traditions, values, and attitudes. This mosaic wall de¬picts a scene of conflict during Moorish domination of the Iberian Peninsula in Europe. (Courtesy of the Portuguese Director-General of Informa¬tion.)
In nonhuman primate societies, social order is maintained primarily by the threat of physi¬cal coercion. Mothers chide and on occasion smack their infants, and dominant males rely on the threat of violence to control the behav¬ior of subordinate males and females. It is rare that a dominant male baboon or gorilla will be obliged to resort to actual conflict in order to enforce discipline. Once a pattern of domi¬nance has been asserted, it is usually only nec¬essary for the leader of the group to raise his eyes and stare at the peacebreaker to bring the offender to order. If staring does not suffice, the leader may growl or even raise himself in readiness to charge the offender. But though the threat of force is normally adequate, the principle of physical coercion remains.
Primatologists recognize elemental mores in primate societies, and coercion is not neces¬sarily enforced arbitrarily.' Undoubtedly there is a drive to maintain a basic harmony of thought and behavior in such societies, and
11'. Dolhinow, Primate Patterns (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972), pp. 369 ff.
once a particular group of males has achieved dominance, they suppress serious squabbling or fighting between members of the group. Social order and group unity are enforced be¬cause no society can afford constant conflict between its members.
In early human societies, however, kinship replaces the threat of conflict as the basis of social order. In small face-to-face societies, such as those of the Yahgan and Pygmies, children are so thoroughly socialized into the traditional patterns of kinship obligation that what we call formal social controls-coercion and the threat of physical force-are generally unnecessary. Instead, informal social controls, resting upon expressions of shame, ridicule, horror, and revulsion, on the one hand, and of approval and admiration on the other, are sufficient to establish a warning atmosphere of social distance between the guilty individual and his kinsmen. Since band membership is for life, few members are prepared to face the hostility and criticism of their kinsmen, and the erring member of a small human band will
normally voluntarily correct his or her behav¬ior in order to regain the approval and good¬will of the group.
In such band-type societies a high degree of social cohesion is inevitable. Lacking deliber¬ately framed laws, the individual roles and statuses-transmitted as custom-are incul¬cated in the minds of all members during the early days of their childhood and are often heavily reinforced by magicoreligious precepts.
Through the intensely personal nature of their interaction, individuals tend to accept their roles in the group without question. Having few ideas or desires other than those which have been transmitted to them in the highly homogeneous culture of the group, they expe¬rience little sense of frustration or of freedorn_ denied. Each individual is permitted to act in whatever ways the culture has taught him to desire, and in the absence of any ideological
Eskimo bands, scattered widely over large expanses of land, are governed only by custom, not by law. Mild disputes are sometimes settled by song contests, in which the disputants vilify and ridicule each other in verse; but more serious disputes between nonkinsmen frequently end in death. (Courtesy of the late R. M. Sharp.)
schisms in his society, the individual seldom conceives of any course of action which his society will not approve. There is consequently relatively little sense of alienation, deprivation, or repression in primitive hunting and gather¬ing communities. When disputes arise between individuals, these can generally be handled by informal social controls. Because of the small¬ness of the group, psychological pressures will generally be effective, and there are seldom any procedures for applying formal social controls. only occasionally, when informal pressure fails to control a psychopathic member, do some groups resort to spontaneous murder. But such action is rare because of the develop¬ment of kinship concepts, and outlawry or expulsion from the group is more common.
abuses and vilifies the other in verse.2 The PUBLIC CONTEST does not purport to solve the dispute with justice, for the participant who insults the other with the greatest dexterity is judged the winner, but there is always the chance that the contest will serve to ease the tensions between the two disputants. The Arunta of Australia similarly encourage public contests between disputants. In their case, the contestants throw spears at each other, in what is normally a harmless ritual performed before the assembled relatives. Blood is seldom drawn, since it is easy to dodge a spear when one knows it is coming, but the contest serves to release tension. In one sense, the custom of the duel, which still persisted in Europe into this century, was another survival-though more deadly-of the ancient tradition of public contest.
Public
In most simple kinship societies there is thus no provision for any formal enforcement of custom, and the simpler human bands have no chiefs authorized to apply force in any form. However, peaceful and cooperative relations are a matter of concern to all members, and when a dispute arises, it is possible that an informal public hearing may be held at which the two opposing individuals publicly state their complaints. Such public hearings can hardly be regarded as trials, since the dispute is regarded essentially as a matter personal to the two contestants and there is no provision for enforcing a decision, even if a judgment were made, except by the power of unanimous social disapproval. Instead, the main function of such hearings is to enable the contestants to verbalize their complaints against each other publicly so as to get the dispute "off their chests.,)
Thus the Eskimoes, like the Icelanders of old, are often invited to settle a dispute in a public song contest, at which each complainant
~-~A...ie.-1 _~:w. ,___
At more complex levels of kinship orga¬nization, the principle of COLLECTIVE RESPON¬SIBILITY usually applies. In such cases the indi¬vidual is not left to defend himself, for since society is now larger and organized into clans or other kinship groupings, all kinsmen are collectively responsible for the protection and good behavior of their relatives. But in addi'¬tion to protecting their kinsmen, the group will also seek to exact vengeance for injuries. This principle of collective responsibility is there¬fore often linked to the BLOOD FEUD,3 a wide¬spread institution among tribal peoples, in¬volving the biblical maxim, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The members of each descent group are expected to revenge any
=Rockwell Kent, N by E (New York: Brewer and Warren, (1930), p. 250.
For a penetrating historical analysis of the blood feud in ancient Europe, see J. T. Rosenthal, "Marriage and the Blood Feud in Heroic Europe," British Journal of Sociology 17:133-143 (1966).
injury done to one of their group, and feuds can develop which continue through the gen¬erations as sons revenge the deaths of their fathers.
There is a very good reason for the kinsman of an injured or murdered man to demand vengeance. In a society in which no man owes any obligation to those who are not his kins¬men, the only bar to widespread murder and pillage is the fear of retaliation. The members of a kin group who do not reialiate when one of their number is victimized will soon get a reputation for being easy victims, and will be ambushed and robbed by rival or alien kin groups with impunity, losing their women and their possessions if not their lives. In such conditions annihilation is the fate of the group which does not retaliate and take vengeance; a reputation for group loyalty and swift venge¬ance has positive survival value in the absence of any system of law enforcement.
But kinship-based societies do not always live in a cauldron of blood feuds. Wherever the blood feud is found, there is usually also a system of traditional composition payments or fines, by payment of which the danger of a blood feud may be avoided. Where physical assault is involved, such composition payments are usually referred to by anthropologists as WERGILD. Collective responsibility combined with the principle of the blood feud therefore means that when a man is injured, his relatives will unite to demand wergild from the relatives of the aggressor, according to a traditional scale of compensation which has evolved through time and precedent. The offender may be unable to raise the full amount of such wergild himself, but this does not matter, for under collective responsibility all the members of his descent group are obliged to contribute to the payment. In short, the conflict is not between two individuals, but between two descent groups; all of the aggressor's relatives must contribute toward _raising the amount of
the wergild, which is then shared among all the relatives of the injured man.
The system of collective responsibility makes each man his brother's keeper, and rather than become responsible for paying wergild, the members of a descent group usu¬ally keep their more unruly members under tight control. Similarly, because the relatives of the injured man will share in the benefits derived from any compensation, bonus, or wergild they are able to collect, they have a direct and personal interest in standing by the rights of all their members. An actual feud only develops when the relatives of the accused refuse to pay the wergild, but this rarely hap¬pens, for few people desire to be faced with a blood feud if this can be evaded by a payment which is relatively light when shared by all the offender's relatives.
=~.u1 . _ . t... ...~
The main problem faced by societies which pay wergild is that of determining the guilt of the accused. In some cases, this mav be achieved by reference to a mediator, such as the Leopard Skin Chief of the Nuer.. In other cases, a tribal council or chieftain may arbi¬trate, since it is a matter of importance to the entire society that internal disputes between clans or other descent groups should be effec¬tively resolved, lest an enemy take advantage of the prevailing state of dissension to stage an attack. Such arbiters may be selected be¬cause they are deemed to possess divine in¬sights which enable them to detect the truth more accurately than lesser mortals, or else they may represent the leaders of the other clans.
Among the Homeric Greeks, disputes were argued before a council comprising the chiefs of the 12 clans of the tribe-a practice which was widespread among the Indo-Europeans and which leaves a vestigial trait in the English
When we reach the level of centralized chieftainships, in which the leader of society is able to exercise coercive power over his subjects, the concept Of PUBLIC or CRIMINAL Law appears. Whereas in private law the state or its representatives cannot intervene to en¬force decisions, and compensation payments go to the injured individual and his kinsmen, under criminal law all offenses are regarded as offenses against the chieftain, king, or other representative of the state, and offenders will be prosecuted by the state and will be subjected to punishment by the state.
It is at this stage in the evolution of social order that the idea of punishment as a deterrent begins to supplant the idea of wergild as com¬pensation, and formal social controls become institutionalized under the direction of the co¬ordinating authorities. Thus, a king or chief¬tain may assume responsibility for enforcing law and order, but since the king will be obliged to maintain some kind of law enforce¬ment agency, using his personal bodyguard perhaps for the apprehension of offenders, he must have some means of supporting these helpers. Eventually the customs change and instead of the full compensation being paid by the relatives of the offender to the relatives of the injured, half of this-and eventually the whole amount-may be paid to the king to compensate for his expenses in apprehending fugitives and enforcing justice.
When feudalism came into Europe and re¬placed the older tribal-type nations, private law came to be supplemented, though not en¬tirely replaced, by criminal law. Indeed it was the kings of the Franks who first began to prosecute offenders, collecting the fine or wergild for the state treasury rather than al¬lowing it to be paid to the relatives of the injured man. As a result of this development, today in Britain and America an individual who suffers as a result of a criminal action may
receive no compensation from the criminal, although the criminal may be fined or other¬wise punished by the state.
Once the king or state becomes responsible for maintaining social order and bringing offenders to trial, there is an inevitable ten¬dency for the concept of punishment to replace the principle of compensation. The king or chieftain will not wish to be troubled by habit¬ual offenders, who pay compensation only when forced to do so. In such cases the tradi¬tional compensation payments become con¬verted into fines, intended as a deterrent to wrongdoers who flout the law, and an effort will be made to make an example of offenders. Physical punishment may be introduced as a supplement or substitute for the fine. Among the Baganda, offenders were cruelly punished, and in modern Libya and Arabia thieves are still punished by amputation of the offending hand Imprisonment may also become common, on the principle that it is more convenient to keep habitual offenders locked up than to have the trouble of hunting them down each time they commit a new offense. The death penalty is an even cheaper and more spectacular way of dealing with serious offenders, especially when execution is performed publicly as among the Ashanti or in Medieval Europe.
Needless to say, the advantage of criminal law is that the state can afford to maintain a permanent police force to enforce law and to apprehend offenders. Where the police force is run efficiently, the law breaker is in a less happy position than under a system of private law. Also there can be no doubt that under the system of private law, blood feuds did some¬times get out of hand. In the eleventh century we find one Swedish king complaining that the constant blood feuds among his people were killing off all their best fighting men, so that he had difficulty in raising a strong army to protect the nation from its external enemies. State intervention in the matter of social order was perhaps inevitable, but even then the prin-
and American legal systems in the 12 members who still serve on a jury. In Homeric Greece, old Germany, and many parts of Europe, these 12 chiefs heard the evidence of "oath takers" or witnesses who were expected to swear to the innocence or guilt of the accused.4 The duty of the jury was to check the validity of the evidence and to count the number of valid witnesses for each side, the decision going in favor of the group that produced the largest number of acceptable witnes-ses. But the jury never decided the penalty or the amount of the compensation; this was determined by prece¬dent or custom. The function of the jury, as today, was limited to deciding the fact of guilt or innocence, and the king or presiding chief¬tain then pronounced the established and cus¬tomary compensation. In later years in Europe, as the size of societies increased beyond the tribal system, the jury came to be composed of 12 local dignitaries, and the kings delegated their role as court chairmen to judges.
Although the jury system was common to many Indo-European societies, in other socie¬ties decisions regarding the innocence or guilt of the accused might be based on magical divination. The Baganda, for example, use magical oracles to determine the identity of the offender, as described in Chapter 28. Similarly, with the coming of Christianity to Europe, the Christian Church opposed the ancient custom of trial by jury and secured the right for Chris¬tians to opt for trial by a church court in which the decision concerning their guilt was arrived at by magicoreligious ordeals. Such trials, re¬lying upon God to indicate by signs the guilt or innocence of the accused, proved popular with those who had reason to believe that they could not prove their innocence in front of witnesses and a jury.
'Judicial councils throughout tribal Europe usually num¬bered twelve members, see "Government in the Heroic Age," in H. M. Chadwick, The Heroic Age (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Chap. 18.
In tribal societies based upon the principles of kinship, the maintenance of social order is essentially a matter of PRIVATE LAW. All dis¬putes are regarded as disputes between kinship groups, and there is no authoritative state officer who is entitled to make arbitrary deci¬sions. Even where the clan leaders sit as a jury, they are seldom authorized to enforce their decisions, and should the losing descent group refuse to pay the traditional wergild, a blood feud may result.
Should a dispute arise within a clan or a kindred, the kinship leader or possibly a kin¬ship council may intervene, but since it is considered morally wrong to lay hands upon a kinsman, OUTLAWRY is the only penalty which can be imposed in such cases. An outlaw has in effect been placed outside the protection of society or in a tribal system outside the protection of his own kin group. He cannot possess property, and may even find his life in danger, for without the protection of kins¬men there is always someone ready to appro¬priate his possessions and slay him if he resists. Thus an outlaw was not someone who had voluntarily put himself outside the laws of his society, but was more usually someone who had been expelled from that society-a man unprotected by "law." The system is surpris¬ingly effective, and costs nothing. It has even been suggested that outlawry might be an effec¬tive and economical way of punishing the more gross wrongdoers in our own society.
Outlawry usually follows FRATRICIDE, the killing of a kinsman or brother. The killing of a kinsman amounts to sacrilege in a kin¬ship-based society but seldom attracts legal proceedings, since the offense concerns only his own descent group. Since the murderer is a kinsman, he cannot be slain because his blood is also sacred, so expulsion from the kinship group is the usual solution.
ciple of collective responsibility did not die at once. The Hittite kings, for example, prose¬cuted justice but held all the relatives of a wrongdoer punishable for his crimes, extir¬pating an entire clan if just one of its mem¬bers turned traitor. The Old Testament of the Bible states that a man's sins shall be visited on his children, and the Incas held village chiefs responsible for the actions of their vil¬lagers.
With the coming of centralized chieftains and the invention of criminal law, the oppor¬tunity for deliberate LEGISLATION or law¬making also appears. Rooted in the principle of kinship, most tribal societies tend to regard Lnw as being simply codified custom, but cen¬tralized chieftains abrogate to the state the right to modify old customs to suit their needs. Centralized chieftains are therefore often great "law givers," like Hammurabi of Mesopotamia and Asoka of India, who collect the old cus¬toms together, edit them, and publish them as "laws." Thus the concept of lawmaking be¬comes accepted. To this day, the English legal system still distinguishes between common law, based upon legal precedent and the idea of custom, and statute law, representing deliber¬ately innovative laws enacted by the King in Parliament.
Law a..' 1` _.
With the old principle of private law steadily giving way to the idea of statute law, power¬ful rulers substitute state law for private law and custom, as Napoleon did with his Napo¬leonic Code. But statute law suffers from the fact that deliberate, man-made innovative laws may often conflict with the traditional customs and mores. While in a tribal society both laws and mores are essentially a part of the culture into which every individual is socialized, and are therefore accepted freely as a part of the content of socialization, in complex modern societies many laws come to be enacted which
offend against the values that an individual may have acquired in the course of his lifetime. In modern societies, therefore, deliberate man-made laws frequently seem to be repres¬sive.
Because the problem of cultural divergency creates animosity and rebellion in multiethnic and multicultural modern states, many ruling political cliques have attempted to reimpose a state of cultural homogeneity upon all the members of culturally diverse states, in an effort to recreate the conditions of simpler, happier, traditional, culturally integrated so¬cieties. Thus many contemporary states em¬ploy government-appointed censors and seek to decide what may or may not be taught in schools and universities. Radio, television, and newspapers may be manipulated in such a way as to persuade the members of society to adopt a single coherent and homogeneous set of cul¬tural values. The Incas effectively integrated all the members of their conquest state into a single cultural system, centered on the wor¬ship of the Sun God and his Incan descendants, by requiring children of conquered tribal lead¬ers to attend school in Cuzco and then sending them back when adequately indoctrinated to rule their tribes as officials of the divine Inca king.5 Similarly, modern totalitarian states¬and even a number of those states which purport to be free societies-seek to suppress cultural variety by making attendance at gov¬ernment schools obligatory and then manipu¬lating the educational curriculum.
There can be no doubt that where a homo¬geneous set of cultural values exists, into which all the members of society have been ade¬quately socialized, there will be a substantial reduction in the number of offenses against the law, providing the law accurately reflects these cultural values. But the spontaneity of cultural homogeneity in small face-to-face societies cannot be recreated in complex societies,
SP. de Cieza de ZeBn, The Incas, trans. by H. de Onis (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), Chap. 47.
for the division of labor and other factors tend constantly to create cultural variety. Attempts at deliberate thought control often cause indi¬viduals, enculturated into different subcultures, to react against the attack upon their own par¬ticular values.
Anthropology consequently reveals the in¬accuracy of philosophical theories which por¬tray the state as the product of a deliberate "social contract," entered into by intelligent men wlac were living alone but who desired to collaborate. Society is older than man, and men never agreed to renounce their freedom. In a primordial band which provides a virtu¬ally complete homogeneity of cultural experi¬ence, petty squabbles may develop, but ideo¬logical differences are nonexistent, and a man can seldom conceive of any course of action
other than that to which he has become habit¬uated since childhood. That which is done according to tradition in a primitive society therefore contravenes no one's freedom; only that which is done in opposition to tradition and custom can represent a violation of tradi¬tional "rights." But in the cultural complexity of industrial societies, much invention, inno¬vation, and personal creativeness arises from the interaction of diverse subcultures. At¬tempts to suppress these subcultures and ;; blend all the diverse components of a complex society into a single mold can easily be inter¬preted as political oppression. There is no sim¬ple solution to the problem of maintaining order in complex societies without resorting to laws which may seem too oppressive to some and too lax to others.
Fustel de Coulanges, N. D., 1970, The Ancient City. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Harrland, E. S., 1971, Primitive Law. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press.
Hoebel, E. A., 1940, The Political Organization and Law Ways of the Comanche Indians. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, Memoir 54.
, 1954, The Law of Primitive Man: fl Study in Comparative Legal Dynarnics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hogbin, L, 1934, Law and Order in Polynesia_ London: Bailey Bros.
Maine, Sir Henry, 1906, Ancient Law. New York: Henzv Holt and Company, Inc. Mair, Lucy, 1962, Primitive Government. Baltimore: Penguin Books., Inc. 11alalinowski, B., 1926, Crime and, Custom in Savage Society. London: Rou-1ledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.
Puhvel, J., (ed.), 1970, Iarfyt1a and Law of California Press.
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R_, 1965. Structure and Function in Primitive Society. New York: The Free Press.
Itosenthal, J., 1966, "Marriage and the Blood Feud in Heroic Europe," British Joaerrzal of Sociolo,;y 17:133-144.
among the Indo-Europeans. Berkeley: University